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Introduction: The Rights of Groups
By JoiN H. GARVEY*

Skeptics might say that the topic addressed in these papers is a
chimera-that it makes no more sense to talk about the rights of
groups than it does to talk about the attributes of God. Neither one
exists. There are grounds for suspicions like these, and one obvious
one is that theologians and sociologists seem to be the people most
interested in groups. Best to avoid enquiries that put us in company
like that.
Others might say that the enterprise is a mistake for precisely
the opposite reason. There are too many groups-an infinite number
actually-and they are too unalike to be lumped together. An incomplete roster of groups includes the United States of America;
men, women, and children; low-income taxpayers; blacks, whites,
Irish, Cambodians; the Juilliard String Quartet; the Chicago Cubs;
the Garvey family; left-handers; Exxon; leap-year babies; and so on.
Anything we could say about all these different groups would have
to be too general to be interesting.
I want to open the discussion by responding to these concerns.
I think that there actually are such things as groups; and that though
there are lots of them, we can classify them and have a sensible
discussion about them. Not only is the subject discussible, but it
comprises much of what is interesting in constitutional law today. I
will address (very briefly) three points: the types of groups; the
issues affecting them; and some common themes that run across
these issues.
First, as to the types of groups. For legal purposes there is a
difference (to speak very precisely and scientifically) between big
and little groups. Big groups are defined by factors like race, gender,
and ethnicity. Membership in them is largely involuntary. I was born
a white man, mostly of Irish-American stock. Examples of little
groups are families, unions, churches, men's clubs, and corporations. Here membership is largely voluntary: people join unions,
churches, and clubs; spouses choose one another (the story is a little
different for their children). Little groups are also internally organized in ways that big groups are not. The Garvey family and the
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First South Baptist Church have rules about who is in charge, how
decisions are made, what the group's priorities are, and so on.
White people, or men, taken as a group, do not.
This is not a very precise taxonomy, but it's good enough for
the purpose of making my next point, which is about the kinds of
problems that groups present in constitutional law. To speak again
very generally, we might say that big-group problems are mostly
about equality and that little-group problems are mostly about freedom. Consider first the case of big groups. I will mention four of
the most visible issues concerning them. All are questions of equal
protection (or its statutory equivalents).
(1) Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC' is an important affirmative
action case because, as Charles Fried and Patricia Williams both
wrote for the Harvard Law Review, it treats racial minorities as
groups for purposes of handing out broadcast licenses. Fried thinks
this is a mistake; Williams thinks otherwise. 2 But for our purposes
the important point is that the case attaches significance to the
simple fact of racial group membership.
(2) The civil rights bill recently passed by Congress is designed
to make it easier for women and racial groups to prove employment
discrimination by showing that they are underrepresented in the
work force.3 The question in disparate impact cases is not whether
the employer has committed a bad act against any particular individual, but whether he has a good reason for not hiring more
members of protected groups.
(3) This year promises to be a banner year for reapportionment
litigation. It's the first even year since the 1990 census, and plaintiffs
are armed with computer programs that we couldn't have dreamed
of ten years ago. In many of these fights, the question is going to
be whether the new districts give racial groups something like proportional representation. This is the problem that Richard Epstein
takes up in his paper.
(4) The most interesting question in school desegregation law is
whether school boards can set up special schools with Afrocentric
curricula for black boys, as Detroit and Milwaukee have tried to

I-

U.S.

-,

110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).

2 See Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality,

104 HAv. L. REv. 107 (1990); Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:
Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HIv. L. REv. 525 (1990).
1 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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do. 4 The idea seems at odds with our efforts to integrate public
schools since Brown v. Board of Education.5 But in many ways
those efforts have failed, and some people are now asking whether
minority groups-if they are willing-should not be allowed to go
their separate ways. In the case of the experiments I mention, this
thought is coupled with the idea that there are important male/
female differences that schools should also try to cope with.
All four of the examples I have given show that we are now
reassessing the conventional wisdom in civil rights law-the ideas
that there are no essential differences between blacks and whites,
between men and women, and that the law should be blind to
matters of race and gender. The ascendant ideology holds that there
are differences among groups-maybe not biological, but at least
psychological and sociological-and that the law should take account
of them in the short run (and maybe in the long run too).
In the case of small groups, the hard issues have been questions
of freedom rather than equality. I will mention four sets of examples
just to give you the flavor of the debate. They concern corporations,
unions, more intimate associations, and churches.
(1) In First National Bank v. Bellotti6 the Court held that
corporations have a right to freedom of speech, but it did not really
explain why. Corporations can't vote, and they don't have the kind
of interest in self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment that
you and I do. Many of the usual explanations for why we have
freedom of speech don't work. Since Bellotti, the Court has revisited
this problem in the contexts of commercial speech and campaign
7
contributions and expenditures.
4 See Garrett v. Board of Educ., No. 91-CV-73821-DT, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15200
(Aug. 15, 1991); Carleton R. Bryant, All-Black School Plan Gets Praise, WASH. Tnsas,
Aug. 23, 1991, Part A, Nation, at A6.
s 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
7 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
- U.S ....
110 S.
Ct. 1391, 1396 (1990) ("The mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove
its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment."); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (holding a provision of the
Federal Election Campaign Act intended to restrict corporate political expenditures unconstitutional as applied to Massachusetts Citizens for Life); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) ("Corporations and other associations, like individuals,
contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that
the First Amendment seeks to foster." (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783)); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) ("Commercial expression not only serves

the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal
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(2) Unions have always been faced with a free-rider problem:
unless they can force reluctant employees to join or at least support
their activities, they have a hard time getting off the ground. But
what happens when the union that has an agency shop arrangement
wants to spend the money of dissenting employees on political causes
that the employees disagree with? If groups can have free speech
rights, what happens when their rights collide with the rights of
their members? This has been a recurrent problem recently under
the First Amendment and the NLRA.8
(3) Various kinds of small groups have claimed a right to freedom of intimate association under the Due Process Clause. Lately,
the claimants have been men's clubs that want to exclude women. 9
They have always lost, though the Court has acknowledged that
they do have some rights, which could be enforced if the proper
case came along. Families-or groups that look like them-are the
other contenders for this kind of freedom, in cases where the government tries to interrupt their living arrangements. 10
(4) In the case of churches, the questions concern the free
exercise of religion. They arise when the government enforces neutral
laws that have a peculiar impact on religious organizations. Fair
employment laws are one example. Such laws usually forbid discrim-

interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information."); &eealso Meir Dan-Cohen,
Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations,
Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1229 (1991).
1 See Keller v. State Bar,
- U.S. , , 110 S. Ct. 2228, 2236-38 (1990)
(state bar cannot use dues to finance lobbying and amicus activity for causes-unrelated to
regulation of the legal profession-that some members disagree with: gun control, environmental control, nuclear weapons freeze, etc.); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S.
292, 310 (1989) (First Amendment requires union to minimize risk that non-union employees'
contributions will be used for impermissible purposes, and to provide adequate justification
for advance deductions of dues); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466
U.S. 435, 456 (1984) (union's use of dissenting employees' contributions for union publications and conventions created "little additional infringement of First Amendment rights
beyond that already accepted, and none that is not justified by the governmental interests
behind the union shop itself"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 210 (1977)
("The Constitution requires that a union's expenditures for ideological causes not germane
to its duties as a collective-bargaining representative be financed from charges, dues, or
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing such causes and who are
not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.").
9 See New York State Club Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Directors
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984).
10 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Constitution does not confer to homosexuals a fundamental right to
engage in sodomy).
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ination on the basis of sex or sexual preference. Can anti-modem
Christian churches be forced to hire women or practicing homosexuals for their ministry? Or consider the law governing church schisms:
can a court apply formally neutral rules of contract and property
law to a hierarchical church that has its own internal mechanism
for resolving disputes?" In his paper, Ronald Garet points out that
2
the case of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n1
is essentially like these problems.
Notice that in each of these little-group cases the question is
whether the group is entitled to act in some way: to live or play
together, to speak or make campaign contributions, to distribute
property or hire employees. A sociological group as big as women
or blacks cannot be said to engage in collective action or make
collective choices. But smaller groups can make decisions and engage
in concerted action: churches worship; corporations speak; unions
endorse candidates; families rent apartments. That is why we have
questions about freedom here and not with big groups-freedoms
are rights to act in certain ways.
I have spoken about the types of groups we see and about the
issues they present in constitutional law these days. I will now
conclude by pointing out a few themes that are common in these
cases precisely because they are problems about groups. One such
theme is whether groups really are morally significant-or whether
they are just a useful device for aggregating the interests of their
members. In the case of big groups, this is a debate about essentialism-the theme that Deborah Rhode addresses in her paper on
lawyers representing groups. Is there a women's perspective? A
peculiarly feminine approach to moral reasoning, problem solving,
etc.? Are women all (or mostly) like one another and different from
men in some important ways? In a word, does it make sense to talk
about women as a group? The same goes for racial groups. Do
people of color have something special to contribute to academic
debates? Should lower schools try to isolate and preserve cultures
that are uniquely black, Hispanic, or Chinese? Is there a black
constituency that should be represented in the legislature?
If we agree that groups really do exist, we still have to explain
how they can have rights. Think about the problem of black reparations. Suppose we decided that one just form of atonement for

"

See Jones v. Wolf,443 U.S. 595 (1979); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free

Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 42-44.
12485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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the sin of slavery in America would be to have whites make monetary reparation to blacks. The first problem is defining the group.
What about blacks who arrived after 1868? What about blacks who
intermarried with whites? What about family lines that came to an
end? Advocates of reparations argue that the relevant group is not
just those who can prove direct descent from former slaves. It would
usually be impossible to make such proof; and anyway lots of other
people inherited the legacy of slavery. Suppose, then, that we define
the beneficiary group as "blacks in America today." What sense
does it make to say that this group, with such various members, is
entitled to reparations? It might be easier to understand if the group
had a legal personality-like the state of Israel, or the Blackfeet
Indians-but that's not how it is with most big groups in the United
States. A right is a legal relationship, and it's hard for big, fuzzy,
unorganized groups to enter into legal relationships.
This second theme-how groups can have rights-underlies the
debate about whether we should limit affirmative action to actual
victims of discrimination. If others should get help, it is because
they are members of a group, not because of any personal desert.
It also explains our resistance to proportional representation in
election law. Hispanics make up twenty-eight percent of the population of Houston. If Houston had all single-member districts, and
Hispanics were entitled to proportional representation on the city
council, how would we explain the relationship between Hispanic
council members and Hispanic "constituents" outside their districts
who can't vote for them?
A third theme, closely related to the first two, runs through the
cases involving small groups: how should we deal with conflicts of
rights between groups and their members? Do corporations have a
right to take political positions over the objections of dissenting
shareholders? Why should the Presbyterian Church have a right to
dispose of local church property over the objection of a majority
of the local church members? Or conversely, why should a woman
have sole authority over the decision about an abortion when the
rest of her family disagrees? We cannot decide these questions
without first deciding whether the group is something more than the
sum of its members, and whether it can have rights of its own that
are different from the rights of its members.
I haven't done any more than scratch the surface of any of these
questions. But I hope I have been able to show why the subject of
group rights deserves systematic and in-depth exploration. The articles that follow take a closer look at some of the problems I have
mentioned.

